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PANNING FOR GOLD
Assessing Chinese Maritime Strategy from Primary Sources
Ryan D. Martinson

W

hat are the drivers behind China’s vigorous pursuit of sea power? What
are the interests Beijing seeks to advance by building a powerful bluewater navy and the world’s largest coast guard? What are the principles that guide
its use of sea power in pursuit of its national interest? How are China’s state objectives, and approaches to pursuing them, evolving over time?
The answers to these questions are of obvious concern both to the states along
China’s maritime periphery, many of which are party to maritime disputes with
Beijing, and to external powers with major interests in East Asia, such as the
United States. Increasingly, Chinese actions have important implications for
other parts of the watery world, such as the Indian Ocean region, where China
has maintained a constant naval presence since late 2008.1
Those seeking to gauge and define Chinese policy must be willing and able to
draw on all available sources of information. Most fail to do so. The vast majority
of analyses of China’s maritime strategy focus almost entirely on Chinese behavior: what it has done, what it has built. In particular, most highlight a small number of events or cases from which they draw conclusions about Chinese strategy.
To be sure, Chinese actions are the best indicators of Chinese strategy. They
reveal exactly what Chinese policy makers are willing to do. They provide raw
data that cannot be manipulated. However, the specific drivers of a given behavior are often open to interpretation. Some analysts, for example, assume that Chinese actions in the “near seas” of East Asia are a product of a carefully designed
and implemented national strategy, with head and arms working in perfect
coordination. However, were these analysts familiar with the breadth of Chinese
writings lamenting the country’s lack of well-defined ends, ways, and means, they
might revise this proposition. While strategy is surely involved, Chinese mariners
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probably are not acting out a detailed script for regional dominance.2 Moreover,
a particular action may be the result of local initiative, or later may be judged a
mistake, in which case it may not portend future behavior. The 2009 Impeccable
incident, discussed below, may be a case in point.
Judicious use of authoritative statements about Chinese maritime strategy can
validate and enrich assessments made on the basis of observed behavior, ameliorating the problems described above. Many of those who research and write on
contemporary maritime issues, however, are not fully aware of the potential value
of original Chinese documents. Moreover, those who are aware often disagree,
sometimes fiercely, about which sources are most useful.3 This problem is exacerbated by the tremendous proliferation of Chinese documents in recent years, a
challenge that has aptly been called “a poverty of riches.”4
This article seeks to describe the range of sources available for helping to
understand Chinese maritime strategy and to assess their relative value. It comprises five parts. Part 1 outlines basic assumptions and defines key terminology.
The subsequent three parts examine three distinct categories of sources, grouped
according to the role of the author or speaker: those who formulate Chinese
maritime strategy, those who implement the strategy, and the scholars and pundits who define and influence it. The article concludes by offering a set of general
rules for assessing the value of Chinese sources on maritime strategy.
The primary aim of this article is to identify specific individuals and their
affiliations and draw conclusions about why their statements may (or may not)
shed light on Chinese maritime strategy. For illustration purposes, the article will
offer examples of the type of information that may be gleaned from close reading
of those sources. It does not, however, seek to define Chinese maritime strategy
comprehensively, per se.
DEFINITIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
This article focuses on Chinese “maritime strategy,” defined as state policy governing the development and use of sea power to achieve national objectives in
peacetime.5 It adopts a narrow definition of sea power: those instruments the
state wields directly to achieve objectives on or from the sea.6 These instruments
include the Chinese military, above all the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy;
Chinese maritime law enforcement forces, especially the China Coast Guard;
and the maritime militia, i.e., civilian mariners, often fishermen, who sometimes
perform state functions.
The term “maritime strategy” (海洋战略) seldom appears in Chinese documents. Chinese decision makers do not refer to one overall set of policies governing use and development of all the sea services. PLA Navy strategists write
of “naval strategy” (海军战略) or “maritime security strategy” (海上安全战
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略); the former only involves naval forces, while the latter seeks to leverage all
the components of sea power (i.e., military, maritime law enforcement, and
militia).7 Leaders in China’s maritime agencies, especially the State Oceanic
Administration (SOA), tend to use the term “maritime development strategy”
(海洋发展战略), which refers to an overall national approach to leveraging the
ocean and ocean-related industries to support Chinese economic development.
Maritime development strategy also encompasses “maritime rights protection”
(海洋维权), meaning the use of maritime law enforcement forces to defend and
advance China’s position in its
There is very little publicly available informa- maritime disputes.8 The term
“maritime power strategy”
tion about the . . . entity . . . created . . . to
(海洋强国战略) is often used
formulate and coordinate maritime dispute
policy among the SOA, the Ministry of Foreign synonymously with “maritime
development strategy.”9 Some
Affairs, the Ministry of Public Security, the
in the SOA, including deputy
Ministry of Agriculture, and the military.
director Sun Shuxian, speak
of “maritime rights protection strategy” (海洋维权战略), which refers very narrowly to the use of sea power to defend China’s maritime claims.10
That Chinese policy makers seldom use the term “maritime strategy” is significant. It suggests a compartmentalization among China’s sea services. This
fact, however, does not invalidate use of this term when examining how China
develops and uses sea power. For analytical purposes, Chinese maritime strategy
comprises a set of policy guidelines—however compartmentalized—governing
the development and use of sea power to pursue a range of peacetime purposes.
These include, inter alia, deterring Taiwan from formally declaring independence, deterring American military intervention in a regional conflict involving China, defending and advancing China’s position in its maritime disputes,
expanding China’s strategic depth in the maritime direction, ensuring sea-lane
security, cultivating Chinese “soft power” through naval diplomacy, and protecting the lives and property of Chinese citizens in foreign lands.
This article assumes that the statements of those in positions of authority
within the party-state or military are most likely to reflect actual policy. This assumption is uncontroversial. However, authority does not always imply reliability. Sometimes individuals who ostensibly hold positions of authority disseminate
propaganda aimed at shaping opinions at home and abroad. In such instances,
their views may be unreliable. This tendency will be discussed in some detail in
part 2. This article also generally dismisses the public statements of Chinese diplomats, who naturally have a strong interest in downplaying Chinese ambitions
and vindicating Chinese actions.
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This article examines the statements of individuals. Because of their obvious importance and because they are the best-studied sources for understanding Chinese strategy, documents that the Chinese state issues directly are not
examined in any detail. These include national defense white papers, five-year
plans, party and government work reports, government yearbooks, and laws and
regulations.11
POLICY MAKERS
Major decisions affecting China’s maritime strategy are made by senior members
of the party-state in secret sessions in Beijing. Outside observers have little or no
access to information on the content of these meetings. The Chinese legislature
does not summon Chinese policy makers for public inquiries at which they are
questioned about national security policy. The decisions of the Central Military Commission, which guide naval policy, are classified; when information is
released, it is often dated and incomplete. There is very little publicly available
information about the Maritime Rights and Interests Leading Small Group (中
央海洋权益工作领导小组), an entity the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or
Party) created in the second half of 2012 to formulate and coordinate maritime
dispute policy among the SOA, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry
of Public Security, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the military.12 Sources on
the State Oceanic Commission (国家海洋委员会), set up in 2013 to formulate
China’s maritime development strategy, are likewise extremely sparse.13 Scholars
do, however, have access to “the strategy” as Chinese policy makers articulate it
when they openly speak about maritime issues. Given the obvious authority of
such sources, they should be regarded as key building blocks for any effort to
define Chinese maritime strategy.
One such source is the official summary of a July 2013 CCP Politburo “study
session.” An innovation of Hu Jintao, Politburo study sessions take place at
roughly one-month intervals. Two experts are invited to provide lectures on the
topic under discussion.14 During these sessions, the Party leader outlines his
views on the topic. These reflect state policy.
At the 30 July 2013 study session, the Politburo discussed the topic of building
China into a “maritime power” (海洋强国), an objective identified eight months
earlier in Hu Jintao’s work report at the Eighteenth Party Congress. The official
summary of the meeting provides a precious glimpse into how China’s top leaders
conceive of the country’s relationship with the sea.
A close reading of this document reveals that the party-state’s definition of
“maritime power” is very broad. Maritime powers use the ocean to build wealth.
Their marine science and technology are advanced. They are able to exploit
marine resources effectively. When they use the ocean, they take steps to avoid
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss3/4
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harming its ecology. That the two invited lecturers were both civilians is a clear
indication of this economic focus.
However, maritime powers are also able to safeguard their maritime rights and
interests, and a careful reading of Xi Jinping’s remarks also suggests endorsement
of an assertive turn—in his words, a “transformation” (转变)—in how China
handles its maritime disputes, an assessment that observed behavior has borne
out. In Xi’s words, “We love peace and will continue along the path of peaceful
development, but we absolutely cannot abandon our legitimate rights and interests, much less sacrifice our core interests.”15
Official coverage of Xi Jinping’s attendance at the Fifth National Border and
Coast Defense Work Meeting in Beijing in June 2014 offers another example
of the availability and value of policy-maker statements. This event is relevant
to China’s maritime strategy because “ocean defense” (海防) involves much
more than preventing foreign invasion along China’s coast; it refers to actions to
defend all “Chinese” space from encroachment, including offshore islands and
remote waters under Chinese jurisdiction.16 The Xinhua news agency published
an official summary of Xi’s remarks. Xi recalled the humiliating and damaging
experiences of modern Chinese history, when China “was poor and weak . . .
and suffered several hundred instances of foreign encroachment.” As a result,
China must place the highest priority on sovereignty and security, “resolutely
safeguard territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests,” and build an
“an impregnable wall [literally, “a wall of copper and iron”] for border and ocean
defense.” Other senior leaders spoke at the event, but media coverage of the meeting gave them scant mention—the focus was Xi Jinping.17
Xi’s remarks take on special meaning when contrasted with official media
coverage of Hu Jintao’s participation in the same meeting in January 2010. Aside
from shaking hands and posing for group photos, Hu played no role in the earlier
event. People’s Republic of China (PRC) minister of national defense General
Liang Guanglie delivered the keynote address. Liang’s speech balanced out patriotic content—“defending the security of national territorial sovereignty and
maritime rights and interests must be seen as the sacred mission of border and
coastal defense work”—with conciliatory words about the need to “deepen and
expand friendly relations with neighboring states.”18 Such comparisons both suggest the policy shift that has taken place in the intervening years and shed light
on the role Xi may be playing personally in deciding China’s maritime strategy.
Provincial leaders also play important roles in maritime policy. This is especially true for Hainan Province, which administers all the Chinese-claimed land
features within the “nine-dash line” in the South China Sea. Hainan’s marine
policy, then, has direct repercussions for Chinese behavior at sea. Provincial leaders also play a large part in mobilizing civilian mariners to serve in the country’s
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016
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maritime militia (海上民兵). At a meeting in December 2013, Hainan provincial
party secretary Luo Baoming (罗保铭) spoke on the role of provincial militias.
According to an official summary of his remarks, Luo stated that militias serve
a key function in China’s maritime disputes. Their presence in disputed waters
“highlights” (彰显) Chinese sovereignty in the South China Sea.19 The province,
then, must play a role in fostering their growth and development.
POLICY IMPLEMENTERS
Elements of Chinese maritime strategy are reflected in the statements of those
charged with implementing it, above all senior officers within the Chinese military and the Chinese coast guard.20 The civilians in the SOA who directly oversee
China’s maritime law-enforcement agencies also speak and write authoritatively
about the ends, ways, and means of China’s approach to the sea.
PLA Leaders
Among senior officers, the most authoritative statements are naturally those
made by the PLA Navy commander, currently Admiral Wu Shengli (吴胜利).21
Admiral Wu is no Sergei Gorshkov, a senior officer who had pretensions to profound strategic insights.22 In contrast, Wu’s statements are often clogged with jargon and therefore difficult to decipher. They are generally very short on details.
However, in some cases they do offer valuable revelations about “the strategy.”23
In August 2014, Admiral Wu gave a very important speech at a ceremony, held
aboard the aircraft carrier support ship Xu Xiake, to commemorate the 120th anniversary of the first Sino-Japanese War.24 The text was published in the August
2014 issue of China Military Science, with “appropriate abridgment.”25 While the
purpose of the event was to reflect on a historical event, Wu delivered his speech
with contemporary issues very much in mind. For the student of Chinese strategy, it demonstrates the service’s commitment to expanding its role in waters beyond Asia—in Wu’s words, “wherever China’s interests extend.” It confirms that
senior leaders fear that a powerful enemy (强敌—i.e., the United States) seeks to
contain China. Its numerous references to Xi Jinping show that the head of state
takes a keen interest in China’s development and employment of sea power.
The content of Wu’s speech also has important implications for understanding
the nature of China’s commitment to resolve its maritime disputes. He suggests
that the ocean may be equivalent to the land in its importance, declaring that
“we must not only protect every inch of land, but also every inch of the ocean.”
Wu talks about the need to protect both China’s rights under international law
and “historic rights passed down from ancestors,” a reference to Chinese claims
to waters within the nine-dash line in the South China Sea. Wu refers to China’s
claims to “island sovereignty and maritime rights and interests” as constituting

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss3/4

NWC_Summer2016Review.indb 28

6

6/8/16 3:58 PM

Martinson: Panning for Gold: Assessing Chinese Maritime Strategy from Primar

29

M A RT I N S O N

“core interests” (核心利益). Thus, not just offshore land features but also the
zones of sovereignty and jurisdiction emanating from them may now be considered objects of vital state interest.26 Wu’s remarks also provide more specific
insights on current strategy: China should “continue to strengthen control over
[its] claimed maritime space.” Wu’s speech, then, is an index of the PRC’s commitment to resolve the disputes in China’s favor.
The words of other flag officers may also serve as useful indicators of Chinese
strategy. These regularly appear in service publications. On 19 March 2014, for
example, People’s Navy published excerpts of speeches that senior PLA Navy
leaders had given at a meeting held to discuss Xi Jinping’s maritime strategic
thought. All sixteen of these eigth-hundred-to-nine-hundred-character excerpts
are worth reading, but the remarks of Rear Admiral Zhang Zhaoyin (张兆垠),
deputy commander of the South Sea Fleet, stand out.
Rear Admiral Zhang sheds light on the Chinese sea services’ overall approach
to handling China’s disputes in the South China Sea. Zhang candidly acknowledges that the objective of Chinese strategy in the South China Sea is to “continuously expand the strength of Chinese administrative control” and to “progressively achieve effective administrative control” over Chinese-claimed waters.27
That is—in contradiction to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs narrative that China
merely responds to the provocations of other states—the PLA Navy, working in
conjunction with the Chinese coast guard, is pursuing proactively a policy aimed
at controlling disputed land and ocean areas in the South China Sea.28
Coast Guard Leaders
The statements of leaders within the Chinese coast guard and their civilian overlords are also authoritative indicators of Chinese strategy. Liu Cigui (刘赐贵),
head of the SOA from February 2011 to January 2015, frequently spoke and wrote
on China’s efforts at “rights protection.”29 Liu presided over China’s policy shift
from a generally passive coast guard presence in disputed waters to actual efforts
to assert control over disputed waters on the pretext of routine law enforcement.30
Liu’s statements provide useful data for understanding China’s “maritime
power” strategy and how it impacts China’s approach to its disputes. In a 7 June
2014 essay in a SOA-run newspaper, China Ocean News, Liu outlined what was
involved for China to transform itself from a “major maritime state” (海洋大国)
into a “powerful maritime state” (or “maritime power”—海洋强国). Liu’s article
elaborates on many of the themes Xi Jinping had discussed in his remarks at the
Politburo study session eleven months earlier. Liu describes the current period
in very dark terms, as one in which states compete with one another for control
over the ocean and the ability to use the ocean to become wealthy and powerful.
He concludes with a very important admission:
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As can be seen, for a long period going forward, China will face increasing challenges
in its efforts to safeguard maritime rights and interests. The ocean very likely will become the primary direction from which come efforts to interfere with China’s period
of strategic opportunity [to engage in economic development] and threaten China’s
security. These realities require that we continuously improve our abilities to control
the ocean, accelerate the pace of efforts to transform China into a maritime power,
and more effectively safeguard and expand China’s maritime rights and interests.

This and many other similar statements indicate that the national objective is
peacetime control of the sea, and the consequences of failing to realize this aim
could not be more severe.31
Prior to the creation of the China Coast Guard in mid-2013, China Marine
Surveillance (CMS) was the constabulary agency most active along China’s maritime periphery. Thus, the statements of senior CMS leaders also provide useful
indicators for assessing key elements of “the strategy.” In July 2012, just days after
the Scarborough Shoal standoff ended with China in control of the feature, senior
CMS officer Sun Shuxian attended a maritime conference held in Hainan. At
the event, Sun suggested that China should use military force against other (unnamed) disputants, because doing so would “ensure a century of peace.” Sun also
said, “We do not want to be provocative, but we are not afraid of provocations
and cannot tolerate provocations. We cannot simply respond by issuing statements that their actions are illegal and invalid. We must make the provocateurs
pay a cost. By killing one, we can deter a hundred others, thereby preventing the
situation from worsening.”32 This episode sheds light on the personality of an important leader within China’s sea services. Moreover, that Sun was subsequently
appointed deputy commandant of the China Coast Guard and later promoted to
deputy director of the SOA suggests a degree of endorsement within the partystate for Sun’s aggressive attitude toward handling China’s maritime disputes.
Certain commanders within China’s other maritime law-enforcement agencies also have been forthcoming with information on their services’ role in
China’s maritime strategy. Until his retirement in 2014, Wu Zhuang, the head of
the South China Sea branch of Fisheries Law Enforcement, frequently gave interviews to Chinese news outlets. Wu’s own history also sheds light on the mechanism through which policy leads to state behavior, in that individual personalities
can play an important role in events at sea: it was Wu, apparently operating on his
own initiative, who likely ordered Chinese fishing vessels to obstruct the operations of Impeccable in March 2009.33
In a December 2012 interview, Wu spoke of the strategic logic behind a
decision to begin convoying Chinese fishing vessels out to fishing grounds in
disputed waters in the southeastern sections of the South China Sea. The lives
and property of Chinese fishermen were being threatened by the maritime
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss3/4
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law-enforcement forces of other states. Protecting them was a priority because
their presence in disputed waters was extremely important, not for the fish they
were catching, but for the political significance of their activities. Wu said, “Development of fisheries near the Spratly Islands involves questions of sovereignty
over China’s Spratly Islands. ‘Development equals presence, presence equals
occupation, and occupation equals sovereignty.’”34 This statement, uttered by
somebody in Wu’s position, may reflect how Chinese strategists conceive of the
role of civilian economic activity in China’s maritime dispute strategy.
SCHOLARS AND PUNDITS
Any original research on Chinese maritime strategy should rely, to the maximum
extent possible, on the statements of those who formulate and implement policy.
Yet while these sources are far more numerous than most analysts recognize,
leadership statements alone are inadequate. To fill the gaps, students of Chinese
strategy must look to the writings of men and women whose vocation is to define
and influence “the strategy.”
Studying the works of Chinese scholars, however, is an approach fraught with
risk and uncertainty. The easy availability of scholarship and punditry on maritime affairs in China creates a strong temptation to draw heavily on these sources.
At issue is when to regard a particular item as a primary source and when to
regard it as a secondary source (and thus to subject it to the same standards of
evidence as analyses written by non-Chinese scholars).
Any claim a Chinese scholar makes can be regarded as more or less authoritative depending on the extent to which he/she has privileged access to “the strategy.” Scholars who work at research units within the Chinese military or a civilian
maritime agency likely have privileged access to at least some components of
“the strategy.” The extent of access no doubt varies by rank and position; with
seniority comes access. Regardless of rank or position, at best their statements
may serve as proxies for the more authoritative statements of those they serve.
PLA Scholars
Given the prominent role of the navy in Chinese maritime strategy, PLA Navy
scholars no doubt constitute the most authoritative sources in this category. They
work in the Naval Research Institute (NRI), PLA Navy educational institutions
(e.g., the Naval Command College in Nanjing and the Naval Academy in Dalian),
and other military institutions, such as the National Defense University (NDU).
NRI scholars deserve special consideration. NRI was set up at the behest of
the then commander of the PLA Navy Admiral Liu Huaqing. This was in 1985,
during a period of intense ferment in the field of naval strategy.35 NRI scholars
and analysts continue to do important work on strategic issues, much of it for
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internal use. Many NRI products, however, are publicly available. NRI scholar
Senior Captain Zhang Wei (张炜) is among China’s leading experts on the strategic use of sea power.36 Interviewed for a July 2012 People’s Navy article, Zhang
recounted the joy she felt in discovering the theories of Gorshkov and Mahan,
whose work had a “rational core” (合理内核) that transcended the immorality
of their respective periods and systems.37 Chinese policy makers have turned to
her for guidance regarding some of the more difficult policy challenges facing the
regime as it expands in the maritime direction.38
Some publicly available NRI products serve to convey elements of “the
strategy” directly to the fleet. For example, close reading of Senior Captain Ren
Xiaofeng’s (任筱锋) Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations sheds light on
the political assumptions that
animate PLA Navy interpreWu’s [speech] confirms that senior leaders
fear that a powerful enemy (the United States) tations of international law.
Ren defines the PRC’s official
seeks to contain China.
position on the nine-dash line
in the South China Sea, what he terms China’s “traditional maritime boundary
line” (传统海疆线), to mean that China “enjoys historic rights to all of the natural resources” within these waters. Ren’s volume also outlines PLA Navy policies
and procedures for handling encounters with foreign vessels conducting military
surveys (军事测量) in China’s exclusive economic zone.39
The Naval Command College in Nanjing is home to several important PLA
Navy scholars, including Senior Captain Feng Liang (冯梁), a professor in the
strategic research department and director of the college’s Maritime Security
Center. Feng was a driving force in the creation of the Collaborative Innovation
Center for South China Sea Studies (中国南海研究协同创新中心), a think tank
located at Nanjing University, and continues to serve in a leadership position
within this organization.40 Collaborating with NRI’s Zhang Wei, he wrote the
award-winning book Maritime Security of the State (国家海上安全).41 While this
volume, published in 2008, is now somewhat out of date, it provides a good baseline from which to gauge recent changes in China’s maritime strategy.42 Among
his publicly available works, Feng also coauthored China’s Peaceful Rise and the
Maritime Security Environment (中国的和平发展与海上安全环境), another
volume highly regarded within the PLA.43
The bulk of Feng’s work likely involves directing research projects intended for
internal use. His products are read by—or at least given to—Chinese policy makers. For instance, he led a research team studying the topic of “SLOC [sea lines
of communication] security and expanding state interests”; its work purportedly
has influenced Chinese policy makers. He has also researched the topic of the
“21st Century Maritime Silk Road,” again for the reference of leaders within the
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss3/4

NWC_Summer2016Review.indb 32

10

6/8/16 3:58 PM

Martinson: Panning for Gold: Assessing Chinese Maritime Strategy from Primar

33

M A RT I N S O N

military and the party-state.44 Feng also has led projects studying questions vital
to China’s maritime dispute policy. He has researched strategic problems associated with infrastructure construction, presumably Chinese, on islands in the
South China Sea. Moreover, Feng was an important force behind the decision
for the Naval Command College to provide advanced training for maritime lawenforcement officers from CMS. He has also completed dozens of studies on the
roles and missions of CMS forces in maritime rights protection operations, which
doubtlessly have influenced the use of maritime law enforcement in China’s
disputes.45
The PLA Air Force also constitutes an important agent in China’s maritime
strategy. As such, scholars working on its behalf have valuable insights on how
and why China pursues sea power. For example, in a 2015 article published in
China Military Science, Senior Colonel An Peng, head of research at the PLA Air
Force Command College, wrote about the role of the PLA Air Force in China’s
strategic posture in the “maritime direction” (海上方向). Among other useful
data, An’s article highlights the prominent place of the American threat in Chinese strategic thinking. In peacetime, writes An, China must develop airpower
to prevail in the “struggle to contain and counter the containment” (围堵反围
堵, 遏制反遏制) of a certain, unnamed foreign superpower. In a conflict with
another East Asian state, Chinese airpower must be potent enough to counter
the same unnamed foreign superpower’s “military intervention” (军事干预).46
Some authoritative scholarly works are collective efforts published under the
name of a single organization. In such cases, the degree of authority is a function
of the institution, not any individual. Written/edited by three dozen scholars
from the strategic studies department of the Academy of Military Science, the
2013 Science of Military Strategy (战略学) is a case in point. Despite its primary
focus on the prosecution of war (page 4), this volume also has a chapter on peacetime military operations (chapter 8), which naturally include a broad spectrum of
naval operations, from counterpiracy operations to sovereignty patrols through
disputed waters (page 163). Indeed, much of the content in the section on the
PLA Navy’s “strategic tasks” focuses on the service’s peacetime missions (pages
209–21).47
The statements of some members of the PLA thinking class should be received
with skepticism. These are the pundits.48 Their frequent appearances on Chinese
television and their prolific output of often-shallow analyses in the popular press
suggest that shaping domestic and international opinion is a major function of
their work. Their writings and commentary may be guided by instructions to
convince domestic audiences that international affairs are important and that the
party-state is taking steps to protect the nation, and to signal to foreign audiences
that China is willing and able to defend its interests.49
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PLA Navy pundits include Senior Captain Li Jie (李杰) (Ret.) and Senior
Captain Zhang Junshe (张军社), both from NRI; Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo (尹卓)
(Ret.), director of the PLA Navy Informatization Expert Committee; and Rear
Admiral Zhang Zhaozhong (张召忠), a professor at NDU.50 For his part, Rear
Admiral Zhang Zhaozhong has published numerous books and articles aimed at
the mass-consumption market, and he frequently appears on Chinese television
to talk about maritime issues.51 His views are sometimes far-fetched, making him
the target of online pillorying.52 As Andrew Chubb shows, pundits such as Zhang
Zhaozhong openly acknowledge their role as propagandists. This obviously casts
doubt on the reliability of their statements.53
Nevertheless, one cannot discard wholesale the statements of PLA pundits.
In their role as transmitters of national defense policy to the Chinese people, the
pundits may offer useful insights. For instance, when Zhang says that China has
adopted a “cabbage strategy” (包心菜战略) in the South China Sea, who is to
doubt him, especially when his description matches known behavior?54 When
NRI’s Li writes that a primary driver behind China’s “One Belt—One Road” strategy is to counteract perceived American efforts to hem China in from positions
along the “first island chain,” and that the strategy requires a strong PLA Navy,
what logic suggests he is lying?55
The extent to which students of Chinese maritime strategy should ascribe
value to the statements of military pundits clearly is debatable. Therefore, any
scholarship that cites a member of their ranks must reckon with this debate.
SOA Scholars
The same assumption of privileged knowledge applies to researchers working
for civilian maritime agencies. The SOA’s internal think tank is called the China
Maritime Development Strategy Research Institute (中国海洋发展战略研究,
officially translated as the China Institute for Marine Affairs—CIMA). CIMA
scholars are assigned research projects for the direct benefit of Chinese policy
makers, that is, for internal use. One area of focus has been maritime power, a
topic CIMA researchers have studied for years. In 2010, CIMA researchers completed work on a report entitled Research on China’s Maritime Strategy for the
Years 2010–2020: Building China into a Mid-Level Maritime Power, and in 2011
they began another major research project called A Blueprint for Turning China
into a Maritime Power, both for internal consumption.56 Although the original
reports are unavailable, the public writings of CIMA scholars, including CIMA
deputy director Zhang Haiwen (张海文), and researcher Wang Fang (王芳),
make an excellent proxy.57
Individual CIMA experts publish books, scholarly articles, and essays. CIMA
researchers interpret the significance of new maritime policies, place the policies
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into an international context, and contribute to the debate on China’s proper relationship with the ocean. They also analyze developments in China’s relations with
states along its maritime periphery. Examining their assessments over time sheds
light on the evolution of China’s maritime strategy. In May 2007, for instance,
several CIMA experts wrote an analysis of China’s maritime security environment, publishing it in China Ocean News. Looking back at 2006, they conclude
that the implementation of China’s policies of “treating neighbors well, treating
them as partners” and as “harmonious neighbors, secure neighbors, and wealthy
neighbors,” and the diplomatic approach of “building a harmonious world” had
a certain restraining effect on the acquisitive activities of some states, thereby
resulting in continuous improvement in the maritime situation near China.58
Thus, in 2007 the consensus in Chinese maritime policy circles may have
been that a conciliatory approach toward other disputants was proving effective.
This suggests that China’s decision to pursue a more assertive dispute strategy in
subsequent years may have been a result of an internal debate in which Chinese
policy makers decided ultimately that the former approach no longer was bearing fruit.
The statements of two CIMA researchers merit particular attention. One is
CIMA director Gao Zhiguo. Gao was one of only two maritime experts who
briefed the CCP Politburo during the July 2013 Politburo study session (discussed
above).59 Thus, he demonstrably has the ear of Chinese leaders. Aside from internal research projects, Gao publishes academic articles and commentary on
maritime issues, often blending legal and strategic analysis. Gao collaborated
with another Chinese scholar on a treatise outlining the legal bases for China’s
nine-dash line.60 Gao has long advocated for China to draft a maritime basic law,
a comprehensive document that, among other things, could define more fully
the scope of Chinese maritime claims and the penalties for foreign mariners who
encroach on them.61 Perhaps in part as a result of Gao’s efforts, the SOA currently
is taking the lead on researching and drafting a maritime basic law, an objective
on the agenda of the current National People’s Congress.62
The second is Gao’s deputy, Zhang Haiwen mentioned above. Like Gao, Zhang
is a maritime legal expert. Much of her work involves internal reports prepared
for Chinese policy makers’ reference (决策参考建议). For example, Zhang
has led a team researching the question of the rights of Chinese maritime lawenforcement vessels operating in disputed waters. Do foreign states, for instance,
have the right to board CMS ships? Such work has very direct policy implications.
Zhang also advises Chinese leaders on how to handle incidents at sea (突发事
件).63
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CIMA also publishes institutional analyses. It produces the annual China
Oceans Development Report (中国海洋发展报告), a volume that covers a full
range of maritime-related topics, from maritime law to marine-related economic
production. It is an important source for understanding how China conceives of
its maritime rights and interests and how it uses the sea services to “safeguard”
them.
CIMA has an avowed role in state propaganda efforts. In late 2012, at the
height of tension among China and its neighbors in the East and South China
Seas, Zhang Haiwen frequently appeared on television for the purpose of “correctly guiding public opinion” (正确引导舆论). The Chinese people needed to
know the source of tensions—that foreigners were to blame—and they needed
to know that Chinese leaders were acting to defend the nation, thereby “dispelling the misunderstandings” of Chinese nationalists.64 Thus, in settings in
which a large audience is presumed, the reliability of statements made by CIMA
scholars—indeed, the statements of all scholars affiliated with the military or the
party-state—should be scrutinized for any political purpose.
Outside Scholars and Pundits
Unlike their colleagues working for the sea services, outside scholars writing
about Chinese maritime affairs cannot be assumed to have privileged access; instead, the case must be made. Unless it is, their writings lack authority and should
not be treated as primary sources.
When outside scholars publish in authoritative periodicals, their statements
may carry some authority. For example, in the days and weeks following the
above-mentioned July 2013 Politburo study session, Rear Admiral Zheng Ming
(Ret.) was invited by China Ocean News to offer his interpretation of the significance of Xi Jinping’s remarks. In the subsequent article, published on page 1 of
the newspaper, Zheng highlighted Xi Jinping’s use of the twelve-character expression “sovereignty belongs to China, shelve the disputes, and engage in joint development” (主权属我, 搁置争议, 共同开发), an approach that Deng Xiaoping
developed for handling China’s disputes.65 Many people in China tend to omit the
first part—“sovereignty belongs to China”—because it sounds uncompromising.
Xi Jinping’s decision to include it, in Zheng’s view, indicates his resolve never to
make concessions on China’s claims.66 While Zheng Ming himself no longer may
work for the Chinese military—and therefore cannot be presumed to possess
privileged knowledge of the current strategy—the fact that a SOA publication
would invite him to express his views on such an important topic suggests a degree of authority in his statements.67
The work of outside scholars may carry special significance if one can demonstrate direct influence on those who make and implement policy. In such
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cases, the scholarship itself is not important because of its privileged insights on
Chinese strategy; rather, the fact that the scholar is “influential” may suggest that
his/her work reflects thinking within the military, the party-state, or both. Even
in the very best of circumstances, however, this approach is seldom conclusive.
The case of Zhang Wenmu (张文木) sheds light on some of these difficulties.
Zhang is a professor at Beihang Univeristy (formerly Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics).
He was an early and ardent
Liu presided over China’s policy shift from a
advocate for China to build
generally passive coast guard presence in disputed waters to actual efforts to assert control a powerful navy and he sees
over disputed waters on the pretext of routine international affairs in the
starkest geostrategic terms.
law enforcement.
His analyses, often couched in
the idiom of Marxist thought, are sweeping in scope and prone to facile historical
analogy. Zhang’s essays on maritime affairs are collected in On Chinese Sea Power
(论中国海权), a volume that has gone through three editions.68
It is clear that Zhang Wenmu’s ideas have some influence within the Chinese military and the party-state. He is invited regularly to conferences and
roundtables on maritime affairs, including those sponsored by the SOA.69 Indeed,
in 2014 he was asked to lecture to a class of more than eighty SOA bureaucrats
receiving a two-day course on maritime strategy.70 At least some parts of the PLA
attach importance to his work. For instance, he was interviewed about the strategic significance of China’s “One Belt—One Road” strategy, and the transcripts
were published in the July 2015 issue of National Defense, a journal run by the
PLA’s Academy of Military Science.71 All of this suggests that some of his views
on the international environment and the use of sea power have some purchase
among at least some leaders within the SOA and at least some faction of the PLA
Navy. Ultimately, however, this is not very instructive for anybody seeking to
understand Chinese maritime strategy.72
The Chinese press publishes a wide selection of what might be called “navalist” publications. These include Modern Ships (现代舰船), Naval and Merchant
Ships (舰船知识), and Shipborne Weapons (舰载武器). Analysts/pundits who
write for these magazines often delve into important strategic and operational
issues, sometimes with obvious erudition and candor. Seldom, however, do we
learn anything about the scribes themselves, many of whom write under pseu
donyms. Therefore, it is impossible to map out the connection between the views
of authors writing for these publications and the thinking of the men and women
who formulate and implement maritime strategy. In the end, the empirical value
of their statements is negligible.
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The statements of those affiliated with the Chinese military and the party-state
are excellent sources for understanding elements of China’s evolving maritime
strategy. These sources, used in conjunction with behavioral indicators (building
programs, behavior at sea, etc.), allow observers to define the primary contours
of China’s relationship with the sea. Listed below are some general principles for
assessing the value of these sources, distilled from the cases examined above:
1.	 Chinese statements on maritime strategy are useful to the extent to which
they can be shown to be authoritative.
2.	 The statements of men and women responsible for formulating and
implementing policy are the most authoritative indicators of Chinese
strategy.
3.	 The statements of Chinese scholars and pundits should be regarded as
secondary sources (and judged as such) unless these individuals can be
shown to have privileged access to “the strategy.”
4.	 Scholars and pundits who work directly for China’s sea services (or
agencies that manage them) should be assumed to have some privileged
access. This access is likely a function of rank and position.
5.	 Beware the statements of scholars/pundits who work for the sea services
but whose primary work involves internal and external propaganda. The
sincerity of their statements may be questionable.
6.	 Outside scholars and pundits cannot be assumed to have privileged access
to “the strategy.” Privileged access must be demonstrated.
7.	 That an outside scholar is known to be “influential” does not necessarily
mean that his/her views reflect the mainstream thinking of Chinese policy
makers.
8.	 The statements of unknown pundits writing for “navalist” publications
have negligible value as indicators of China’s maritime strategy.
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